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I. INTRODUCTION
Cigarette manufacturers have enjoyed a relatively
sheltered environment with regard to their products and
the products' capacity to cause injury to the consumer.
Even in situations where the products contained foreign
objects, such as bugs and parts of other elements, the
courts have not always permitted recovery for damages
arising from resulting injuries. The manufacturers assert
various defenses, ranging from common knowledge to
federal preemption.
The suits against cigarette manufacturers have im-
mensely increased in number, diversity and intensity, each
further adding to the evidence and public sympathy amass-
ed against the industry. There was no major cause for con-
cern for the industry with regard to the hazards attendant
to the normal consumption of cigarettes until Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc. ' Like Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp.2 in the case of asbestos, Cipollone stands to deter-
mine the future of tobacco products liability litigation.
This article addresses the failure to warn and products
liability claims against the cigarette industry. It will utilize
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some of the medical and scientific evidence available in the
course of the industry's existence and the industry's inter-
nal communication documents which have come to light
in the course of the Cipollone litigation. It will also con-
sider the legal doctrines applied by the courts.
II. WHAT THE INDUSTRY KNEW OR
COULD REASONABLY HAVE KNOWN:
A CASE OF CORPORATE INDIFFERENCE
The crux of liability for cigarette manufacturers is the
issue of what they knew and should have warned about,
or what they could reasonably have known using the
technological and scientific standard at the time before or
during which the cause of action arose. This section deals
with the information, scientific and otherwise, that has been
available and known or should have been known to the
industry.
"[P]ublic awareness of dangers attributed to smoking
has grown in intensity since 1900."3 In any event, the com-
panies have not stopped denying that their products are
harmful. 4 The evidence concerning the hazards of smok-
ing range from scientific to moral and religious condemna-
tions. As early as 1604, King James I blasted tobacco use
when he wrote that it is "[a] custom loathsome to the eye,
hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, dangerous to the
lungs, and in the black stinking fume thereof nearest
resembling the horrible Stygian smoke of the pit that is bot-
tomless."' It is recorded that in 1642 Pope Urban VII
ordered that persons using tobacco on church property be
excommunicated. He declared:
The use of the herb commonly called tobacco
has gained so strong a hold on persons of both
sexes, yea, even priests and clerics, that-We
blush to state-during the actual celebration of
holy mass, they do not shrink from taking
tobacco through the mouth or nostrils, thus
soiling the alter linen and infecting the churches
with its noxious fumes, sacrilegiously and to the
great scandal of the pious ....
A poem published in 1905 chastised the habit of smoking
thus:
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My breath is as sweet as the breath of blown
roses, While you are a nuisance where'er you
appear; There is nothing but snivelling and
blowing of noses, Such a noise as turns any
man's stomach to hear.
7
In 1828, when the toxicity of nicotine was
demonstrated, doctors reduced the prescription of tobac-
co for certain ailments.8 In 1907 there was suspicion that
manufacturers put substances in tobacco in order to cause
addiction. 9 Prior to the twentieth century, the noxious
nature of tobacco caused it to be banned in England, and
heavy duties were imposed on imported tobacco.10
A causal connection between smoking and cancer of
the mouth has been described as far back as the 19th cen-
tury." During the 1950's a causal relationship was
established between heavy cigarette smoking and the in-
cidence of lung cancer. 12 It was recognized in many coun-
tries that the incidence of lung cancer increased
substantially in the period of 1910-60, the most convinc-
ing explanation accounting for it being excessive smoking.13
The increased participation of women in smoking has a
direct relationship with their rate of lung cancer.
14
Studies conducted after 1950 monitored the smoking
habits of groups of healthy persons. Conclusions draw from
these studies indicated that heart and lung cancer mortali-
ty was higher among smokers than non-smokers of the
same group.'" "Studies in a half-dozen countries since
World War II point to a consistently higher proportion of
smokers among lung cancer patients than among 'control'
groups of healthy persons or hospital patients with non-
cancerous ailments."'
6
During World War II, it was documented that when
the Germans occupied Norway and curtailed the consump-
tion of cigarettes, there was a commensurate decline in cor-
onary deaths; and after the war, a rise in cigarette smoking
was matched by an increase in coronary deaths.' 7 There
were studies performed in 1923 and 1924 which showed
the adverse effects of the contents of tobacco on the ner-
vous system and mental functions. 8 While tobacco was
used earlier for therapeutic purposes, it was also recogniz-
ed to cause "many cases of acute poisoning." 9
One study of the impact of smoking on athletic per-
formance produced in 1918 stated that "[iun the cases of
able-bodied men smoking is associated with loss of lung
capacity amounting to practically 10 per cent."20 Most im-
portantly, in 1945 a New Orleans surgeon, Dr. Alton
Ochsner, linked cigarette smoking and cancer; and in 1952
Hammond and Horn studied more than 187,000 men in
their fifties and sixties. This study demonstrated higher
mortality of smokers. 2' In 1953, Drs. Wynder and Graham
of the Sloan Kettering Institute For Cancer Research
reported the results of their experiments which showed that
44 per cent of the mice painted with tobacco tar had
developed skin cancer.22 Researchers for a tobacco com-
pany involved in Cipollone, Liggett Gr6up, Inc., replicated
this experiment and obtained tumors using tar from two
different brands of cigarettes.
23
The unrelenting accumulation of evidence alarmed the
industry thereby causing it to form the Tobacco Industry
Research Committee (TIRC) to finance further research
concerning smoking and health. 24 The purpose behind
TIRC was to demonstrate the industry's social responsibility
and "prove that smoking was not harmful, or at least keep
the question open and undecided."2 5 The industry was
aware of the finding that "smoking conduced to lung
cancer[;]" but it felt there was sufficient ambiguity and
disagreement in medical opinions.
2 6
III. PRE-PREEMPTION:
LITIGATION PRIOR TO 1966
In the early 20th century, when the law of products
liability had not developed to its current status, cigarette
manufacturers were not held liable for injuries caused by
foreign substances embedded in cigarettes. The doctrine
of strict products liability was mired in the insistence of the
courts that there be privity of contract between the
manufacturer and the complaining consumer. Because an
intermediary is involved in the process of distributing the
manufacturer's products to consumers, and the consumer
actually purchased from the intermediary, even though the
intermediary did not alter the final product in any manner,
the plaintiff could not recover, owing to lack of privity.
A. Foreign Substance Cases
In Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon,27 the
plaintiff bit into a bug while chewing tobacco manufactured
by the defendant. His mouth and lips began to smart; short-
ly thereafter his face became swollen and he experienced
dizziness. The court denied his claim because, in the court's
view, tobacco was not a foodstuff and therefore did not
qualify for the exception to the rule that "the manufacturer
of an article or commodity placed by him on the market
for sale and sold by another to an ultimate consumer is
not liable to the [ultimate consumer] for injuries due to
defects or impurities in the article or commodity."28 The
court recognized cigarettes as "inherently bad" and ra-
tionalized that one who purchases a product known to be
unwholesome cannot charge unwholesomeness in a claim
for injuries that resulted from the product.
29
In Block v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 30 plain-
tiffs lips and tongue were punctured by a razor blade
embedded in the cigarette manufactured by the defendant.
His lips became swollen and puffy, requiring medical at-
tention. The court stated that "cigarettes are not within the
class of dangerous articles which render their manufacturer
liable to strangers for a defect such as [the one complain-
ed of in this case]."
3'
In De Lape v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.,32 ap-
plying California negligence law, the court sustained the
plaintiffs claim for injuries incurred when he smoked a
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defectively fabricated cigarette manufactured by the defen-
dant.3 3 The court awarded $2,250, plus costs, to plaintiff.
There are several other "foreign substance" cases where
plaintiffs have recovered against tobacco manufacturers. 4
B. Inherently Hazardous Cases
In other cases where plaintiffs' claims were premised
on the inherently hazardous nature of cigarettes, the defen-
dant manufacturers have not been found liable. In Ross
v. Philip Morris & Co., 35 the court recognized that when
implied warranty claims are asserted, the doctrine of strict
liability prevails and needs no finding of privity to be sus-
tained.36
Having dismissed the privity argument, the plaintiffs
claim was then considered under the theory of strict liability.
Reviewing the state of the art, the court
fail[ed] to comprehend how the ends of justice
could be served by adopting the fiction that the
manufacturer of cigarettes was-as early as
1934- .. . in a better position, except in
theory, than the consumer to ascertain the now
highly-publicized causative relationship between
smoking and cancer of certain areas of the
body.37
The court further attempted to distinguish between cigarette
and other cases where the products contained "readily iden-
tifiable foreign matter .... "38
The court in Ross suggested that the plaintiffs claim
would have been formidable had it been shown that the
harmful substance in cigarettes "was inherent to the original
material or food but was not intended by the manufacturer
to be included in the finished product that was sold .... "39
(Emphasis added). It would seem that what the manufac-
turer intended to include in the finished product that comes
in contact with the consumer is, in effect, guaranteed to
be safe and harmless, the proviso being that the product
be used in the manner prescribed and for the ordinary pur-
pose(s) for which it is intended. It would follow that the
public would seek to hold the manufacturer to a higher level
of liability with regard to substances deliberately included
in the product than where the substance entered the pro-
duct by mere happenstance.4 °
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.,4 the
court, under Pennsylvania law, stated that any factual or
promissory affirmation to the public relating to the
manufacturer's goods constitutes express warranty if the
natural tendency of such affirmation is to induce members
of the public to purchase the product.42 Hence, the court
reversed the lower court's finding that plaintiff had assum-
ed the risk of injury by smoking cigarettes. The evidence
did not show that the smoker knew or had notice of the
harmful effects of smoking.
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In Green u. American Tobacco Co.,4 4 the court, in a
near victory for plaintiff, stated that the manufacturer's "plea
of contributory negligence is ... inapposite to a claim based
on breach of implied warranty."45 It accepted the scientific
evidence showing the hazards of smoking.46 In addition,
the jury found that smoking defendant's cigarettes was the
proximate cause of plaintiffs cancer. Nevertheless, in
remanding to the lower court to determine the issue of
liability, the court observed that the product can be
reasonably fit and wholesome but still cause injury.
47
Judge Cameron dissented in part, arguing that the
court should have entered judgment for the plaintiff on the
issue of liability. 8 "The warranty embodied by the law in
every sale the company made to [plaintiff] was that the
cigarettes purchased by him would not do him harm."
49
Any requirement that plaintiff show that "the cigarettes were
not reasonably fit and wholesome for use by the general
public" would essentially defeat the warranty." The difficul-
ty faced by the courts in these cases has been that of deter-
mining what the manufacturers knew and should have
warned about, could reasonably have known, or did not
know and could not have known.
The court's decision in Green arguably makes it ac-
ceptable for a manufacturer to introduce a totally unknown
product to the market without first exhausting all aspects
of preventive research and testing. The court's reasoning
implies public trust in inventors to vigorously and
thoroughly test their inventions before marketing them to
the general public. What is now known about asbestos (and
tobacco products) suggests that some manufacturers are
willing to betray this trust and conduct minimal research
and testing in order to make quick profits, relying upon the
scientific community to fill in the gaps as problems arise,
The principle of strict products liability is supposed to pro-
tect this public trust by compelling the inventor/manufac-
turer to test and market products at his own peril. To relax
the manufacturer's obligation to consumers is to create a
loophole whereby the consumer is exposed to injury and
the manufacturer reaps a windfall profit.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND
THE THEORY OF ADDICTION
The courts' inability to chart a decisive course in the
area of tobacco products liability was relieved when, in
1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act." It became easier for courts to deny
claims against cigarette manufacturers on the grounds of
federal preemption of state based claims.5 2 While the tobac-
co industry sought to restrict the warning requirement, the
Act was generally recognized as a blessing for the industry.
One F.T.C. Commissioner involved in the enactment of
the Act was quoted as saying:
The tobacco industry is really a hell of a lot bet-
ter off from the overall results than if nothing
had been done. They have been removed from
any responsibility for tort actions. They're sell-
ing a product that's got a warning. If you use
that product, you do so at your own risk.
5 3
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Another factor to consider in this regard is that the
Supreme Court has recognized the drastic effects of
preemption in eliminating every other source of legal
recourse, and, as a result, required both that the challeng-
ed state action unavoidably create a conflict with federal
regulation and the clear intent of Congress be exclusive
federal control.-4 In this regard, the operation of federal
preemption against state tort claims involving smoking in-
juries does not meet the requirement set by the Supreme
Court.
The 'Declaration of Policy' and legislative
history of the [Act] indicate that elimination of
'diverse, non-uniform and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations' was the
purpose of the preemption section. The intend-
ed meaning of 'regulation' is indicated in the
definition and legislative history of the term
'state,' which was defined as 'political bodies'
that 'pass ordinance[s], statutes, etc.' Courts
are not political bodies that pass ordinances or
statutes. Thus, it appears that civil liability,
which is imposed by Courts, was not an evil
whose elimination was sought by the Act.
... The labeling acts manifest neither a con-
gtessional intention to preempt courts from
granting money judgments nor a conflict bet-
ween such judicially imposed liability and
federal law.55 (Brackets original).
Section 1334(a) of the Labeling Act provides: "No
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be
required on any cigarette package."5 6- This does not pro-
hibit the industry from voluntaril, providing information
about the health risks of smoking. Nevertheless, the
manufacturers maintain in their public relations ap-
pearances that this provision prohibits them from including
additional warnings; and in doing this they always state
that the present warnings have been determined to be ade-
quate by Congress.
Section 1334(b) prohibits both state law requirements
or prohibitions based on smoking and health and respec-
ting the advertising and promotion of cigarettes the
packages of which conform to the labeling requirements.5
Manufacturers argue that a finding of liability would, in ef-
fect, operate a state requirement that will cause them to
alter the congressionally imposed labeling and advertising
requirements.5 '
In any event, the preemptive force of the Labeling Act
is not retroactive, thus a plaintiff who fashions a claim
designed such that pre- and post-1966 causes of action
are separated may avoid the operation of preemption on
the whole claim. In Cipollone recovery was premised on
the portion of injury determined to be attributable to the
period of time before the Act entered into force. 9 The
critical question would concern when the industry knew or
could reasonably have known that its products caused cer-
tain injuries about which the public was not warned. The
Cipollone jury seemed to accept that the industry knew or
could reasonably have known of the hazardous nature of
its products prior to, or during, the course of Mrs.
Cipollone's smoking." If sustained on appeal, as the
strength of the District Court's legal analysis suggests is
likely to happen, the last Cipollone decision 61 would form
the bedrock of impending pre-preemption litigation.
The latent nature of the diseases is such that many
such cases are yet to be litigated because the diseases are
currently maturing and being diagnosed, while others are
not yet detected. As a result, the industry may opt for set-
tlement of pre-preemption cases while maintaining a de-
fiant approach toward post-preemption cases. It appears
the industry took a calculated risk which, in the end, pro-
mises substantial windfall profits.62
The public has become aware of the validity and
reliability of the health allegations levied against cigarettes
and their manufacturers, and it has become increasingly
difficult for the industry to claim that it did not know and
could not have known the capacity of cigarettes to cause
harm to its consumers. The Labeling Act has the impact
of providing a warning, thereby protecting the cigarette in-
dustry from subsequent tort liability, which consequently
serves as a windfall for the tobacco industry.
63
Because cigarette smokers become addicted to
nicotine, 64 the present warnings are inadequate; they fail
to apprise the public of the powerful impact of addiction
on the ability to quit after a few packs or weeks of volun-
tary and experimental smoking.6 It is one thing for a
smoker to engage in smoking knowing it is hazardous, but
presuming that he can quit at will; it is quite another to
be trapped into continued and involuntary participation in
the hazardous activity. In other words, one may choose
to smoke the first ten packs or for the first two weeks and
then quit; but if addiction is achieved, the person may be
powerless to stop. As a result of this failure in warnings
provided by the Labeling Act, it is hard to conclusively
presume that the smoker had full knowledge and apprecia-
tion of all the significant risks involved in smoking.
66
The problem of addiction has been known to exist,
but the industry failed to disclose it presumably because
it creates a captive market. Tobacco induces tolerance
which generally requires continued reinforcement, thereby
causing chronic indulgence.67 "Certainly it has not been
easy for a nicotine addict to recognize the harmful effects
of his addiction, nor for an industry to accept that its pro-
ducts may cause serious disease among those who use
them."68 In 1828, nicotine was isolated from tobacco and
determined to possess narcotic properties "so toxic that
'a fourth drop' was enough to kill a rabbit."69
The reactions attendant to cessation of smoking have
been documented; they are the withdrawal symptoms
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related to nicotine addiction. Any attempt to stop smok-
ing may be followed by unpleasant experiences ranging
from a craving of tobacco to anxiety, restlessness, irritabili-
ty, and other physiological consequences."0 The
respiratory, circulatory and digestive systems are adverse-
ly affected." Nicotine affects the central nervous system
and diminishes psychomotor performance.72 "It is definitely
known that nicotine, chemical irritants and carcinogenic
substances have a harmful physical effect during the pro-
cess of smoking. Nicotine is especially toxic to the nervous
system and affects the circulatory organs either directly or
indirectly."1
3
One suggestion to counteract the harmful effects of
smoking and addiction is the provision of a detailed warn-
ing, particularly since many smokers start the habit at a
young age when they do not fully understand and ap-
preciate the magnitude of the risk of addiction."
Given the fact that [about 85% of teenagers
who experience more than one cigarette
become regular dependent smokers], the tobac-
co industry's failure to join in the public effort
to inform its young customers of the extreme
danger of smoking takes on the appearance of
unparalleled display of corporate indifference."
While the various provisions and amendments to the Label-
ing Act may have improved the flow of information, 6 and
while many people are aware of nicotine's addictive nature,
the goal of protecting the unsuspecting public will never
be completely achieved until the warning of addiction is
included.
Liability for failure to warn of addiction has been found
in a case unrelated to tobacco. In Crocker v. Winthrop
Laboratories,77 the manufacturer of an analgesic was in-
itially held liable for failing to warn of the drug's addictive
capacity. Plaintiff had become addicted to the drug after
a few months during which he had been treated with the
drug for frostbite. This addiction consequently led to his
death. The jury found that, based on the scientific
knowledge at the time the drug was placed in the market,
the manufacturer could not have known of the addictive
nature of the drug."8 The jury also found that the plain-
tiffs reaction to the drug was owing to his unusual suscep-
tibility to the drug or its intended effect.7 9 However, the
jury's finding of liability was based on the fact that the
manufacturer had represented to the medical community
that the drug would not induce physical dependence.80 This
representation could have been construed to induce reliance
and dispensation of the drug on the part of plaintiffs physi-
cian.8" The trial court's finding of misrepresentation com-
ports with the general rule that:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels
who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes
to the public a misrepresentation of a material
fact concerning the character or quality of a
chattel sold by him is subject to liability for
physical harm to a consumer of the chattel
caused by justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligent-
ly, and
(b) the customer has not bought the chat-
tel from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller.
82
In Cipollone, the plaintiff started smoking in 1942,
when she was sixteen and in high school. She was influenc-
ed by the cigarette advertisements posturing glamorous
women and featuring characteristics suggesting that smok-
ing was not unhealthful. The women in the advertisements
appeared to her as liberated women because they smok-
ed. She switched brands several times. She also attemp-
ted to quit when her husband insisted that smoking was
dangerous and brought her reports about smoking dangers.
She was unable to quit and believed that cigarette manufac-
turers would not do anything that would harm anyone.
In the analysis of proximate cause in Cipollone, the
court stated that there was evidence
from which the jury could conclude that Mrs.
Cipollone's smoking after 1966, in the face of
congressionally mandated warnings, was not
an intervening or superseding cause that would
relieve [manufacturer] of liability. [There was]
evidence that Mrs. Cipollone's tobacco
dependence prevented her from making a free
and fully informed decision as to her continued
smoking.8 3 (Emphasis added.)
The dependency-causing characteristics of cigarettes
was known to the defendant, but warning was not provid-
ed; instead the defendant sought, through pre-1966 ac-
tivities, "to provide a rationale through which
tobacco-dependent smokers could justify continued smok-
ing. ""' This helps to understand the court's failure to per-
mit the operation of preemption against the claim. The
pre-1966 failure to warn of addiction was part of the prox-
imate cause of Mrs. Cipollone's injury which accumulated
over the period of her 24 years of pre-1966 smoking.
V. POST-1966 CASES: THE ANOMALY
OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY LIABILITY
The civil immunity enjoyed by the cigarette manufac-
turers is unparaleled in the history of products liability. No
other producer of intimately consumed products can boast
of this phenomenon, 85 except, perhaps, the alcohol in-
dustry. "The automobile, drug, and machine tool industries,
as well as various consumer product industries, have all
been held liable for injuries associated with their dangerous
products."
8 6
In similar products liability cases not involving tobac-
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co products, manufacturers have, in a fairly consistent pat-
tern, been held accountable for injuries to consumers of
their defective products."
Under the principles of strict tort liability, the
manufacturer is liable for injury or damage pro-
ximately caused by a defective product,
although such manufacturer has exercised all
possible care in the production of his product.
The fact that the injury-causing defect was
unknowable is of no consequence in such an
action. As between the blameless user and the
blameless manufacturer, the doctrine imposes
the responsibility on the manufacturer, who
placed the product on the market.8"
This is further justified by the fact that "the manufacturer
created the risk and has profited from the product,"8 9 and
has better cost distribution capacity than the consumer.9"
The focus in strict products liability is the product, as
opposed to the negligence standard of focusing upon the
defendant, and "the threshold question is whether the pro-
duct was in a defective condition at the time it left the
manufacturer's control, rendering it unreasonably
dangerous."91 If such defect is the proximate cause of in-
jury, the manufacturer is liable to the consumer,92 except
where proper and adequate warning was provided regard-
ing the defective condition.9" It has been held that the dilu-
tion of warnings resulting from overpromotion may create
liability.9 4 Furthermore, "[a] warning may be inadequate if
it does not specify the risk presented by the product; is
inconsistent with the manner of using the product; does
not provide a reason; or does not reach foreseeable
users."9
5
Each year there are at least three-hundred thousand
deaths related to the use of tobacco products, yet the tobac-
co industry is the only industry with blanket immunity
against the wave of twentieth-century products liability. 96
One explanation for this is the fact that the economic in-
fluence of tobacco has become so pervasive that "its
cancerous web has created an atmosphere in which the
government clearly prefers wealth, not health."97 The
economic interests affected by the tobacco debate are very
organized and cohesive, and have substantial resources at
their disposal, hence their capacity to lobby Congress ef-
fectively.98
Following the passage of the Labeling Act in 1965,
cigarette manufacturers have relaxed their strategic stan-
dard and pattern of denying any claim that they knew of
their products' hazards but failed to warn about such
hazards. For example, a major cigarette manufacturer's
lawyers wrote an article in which they insist that the hazar-
dous nature of tobacco use has been a matter of common
knowledge prior to the twentieth-century. 99 Apparently they
failed to recognize that their argument that the public has
known for several years is patently inconsistent with their
claim of lack of knowledge of such hazards in failure to
warn products liability litigations. The industry may even-
tually find out that the Labeling Act has not the type of
sanitizing effect which may have encouraged the article.
It is untenable to claim that the public knew of the
hazards before the industry; it is equally unacceptable to
reject smokers' claims for their failure to heed reports of
health hazards which the industry vehemently disputed.
While other courts have allowed tobacco manufacturers
to maintain this inconsistent position, the Cipollone court
declined the invitation to continue it.100
In Green"' the jury found that the plaintiffs injuries
were caused by smoking, and in Cannon'0 2 the court
characterized cigarettes as "inherently bad." In the flood
of recent cases, Cipollone poses the biggest threat to the
cigarette industry. For one thing, the plaintiff amassed
substantive evidence which shows that there has been a
cooperative effort to deny and refute any connection bet-
ween smoking and health, and also to confuse the public
and maintain an open channel of doubt about scientific
reports that connect smoking and health. 10 "The jury may
reasonably conclude that defendants were members of and
engaged in [a tobacco industry] conspiracy with full
knowledge and disregard for the illness and death it would
cause ... ."104 Plaintiff also proffered evidence "to establish
an intentional and deliberate campaign to undermine and
neutralize the Surgeon General's warnings."'0 5
In denying defendant's motion for directed verdict, the
court reached the conclusion that there was ample evidence
for the jury to conclude: (1) that defendant (Liggett) "should
have warned of the health hazards of smoking at various
times prior to 1966[;]"106 (2) that "Liggett's pre-1966 con-
duct was a proximate cause of Mrs. Cipollones illness and
death.... Liggett's pre-1966 warranties proximately caus-
ed Mrs. Cipollone's pre-1966 smoking and.., such smok-
ing contributed substantially to her injuries[;]""° (3) that
defendants intentionally concealed and misrepresented
facts concerning the state of knowledge respecting the
health consequences of smoking, knowing that such
representations were false, and intending that consumers
would rely on them to purchase cigarettes; hence defen-
dants induced Mrs. Cipollone to purchase cigarettes on the
basis of such representations, thereby causing her injury.1
0 8
On the basis of the facts and evidence in Cipollone, and
following the court's rationale, it is incumbent upon the
Court of Appeals to sustain the decision.
In other cases, however, several other courts have held
in favor of the cigarette manufacturers. In Palmer v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 09 the plaintiff alleged negligent failure to
provide adequate warnings about the harmful effects of
smoking, and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the smoker's death. It appears that plaintiff began smok-
ing after the Labeling Act had gone into effect." 0 Hence,
the court held that the Labeling Act preempted the state
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law claims, and reversed the district court. The court noted
that "Congress mandated the precise wording required in
the label, rather than merely establishing the 'minimum re-
quirements' standard often found in labeling acts .... .""
The District Court had held that compensatory damages
did not constitute extra-statutory regulation so as to be ex-
pressly preempted; but the Court of Appeals responded
that it viewed compensatory damages as "potentially
regulatory in nature."' 
2
The preemption clause.., expressly prohibits
'state law,' not merely 'statutory law[J' from im-
posing any 'requirement or prohibition' different
from the Act's waffing label.... If a manufac-
turer's warning that complies with the Act is
found inadequate under state tort theory, the
damages awarded and verdict rendered against
it can be viewed as state regulation: the deci-
sion effectively compels the manufacturer to
alter its warnings to conform to different state
law requirements as 'promulgated' by a jury's
findings." 3
Furthermore, the practicalities of such a finding would in-
volve a conflict between federal and state laws.
114
The court, in equating civil liability with state mandated
regulation, failed to recognize that the manufacturers could
respond to their civil liability by providing additional warn-
ings to make complete the one required by Congress. The
label required by the Act must always appear and may not
by state requirement be altered; but while the manufacturers
are not at ease to alter the required label, they are not con-
comitantly restrained from making such improvements on
the warnings as would enhance the information to the
public regarding the health hazards of smoking. The wor-
ding of the Act permits them either to alert Congress upon
discovery of previously unknown health hazards so that
Congress will improve the warning label to reflect the new
discovery, or to voluntarily provide additional warnings that
would adequately warn of such hazards.' 15
In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.," 6 the court
agreed with the manufacturer that the Act was intended
to shield tobacco companies from exposure to tort liabili-
ty, and that to require warnings beyond the federally man-
dated ones would defeat the purpose of labeling
uniformity."1 7 In Palmer, 118 the District Court denied a mo-
tion addressing preemption. The court reasoned that
preemption of state claims would effectively immunize the
industry from all tort liability, and this outcome was not
intended by Congress.
Expressing similar sentiments, the District Court in
Cipollone held that state civil remedy does not impose a
new standard for cigarette labeling; it only informs the
cigarette companies that they manufacture hazardous pro-
ducts at the risk of incurring damage claims against them.
This decision was overturned by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals on the ground that preemption was implied in
the Act owing to conflict between state and federal laws. 119
Actions under state law are preempted when they challenge
the adequacy of federally mandated warnings.
120
Successful assertion of common law claims would not
impose any new regulations or labeling requirements. The
Supreme Court has determined that the effect of compen-
satory and punitive damages is not regulatory.' 2' In
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 12 the defendant challenged
as regulatory, and therefore preempted by federal law, an
award of $10 million in punitive damages. Finding no ir-
reconcilable conflict between state and federal laws, or
frustration of federal law, the court held that punitive
damages were not regulatory and therefore not preempted.




The defense of common knowledge of hazards has
been raised by the cigarette industry.123 In Miller v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp.,1 24 the defendant contend-
ed that "products such as cigarettes cannot be deemed
defective because the alleged risks of such products have
been part of the common knowledge of consumers for
years."125 The court agreed, stating that "[i]f there were con-
taminants other than those commonly known to be pre-
sent in their cigarettes, defendants presumably could be
exposed to liability ..... 126
In Cipollone the court recognized and dealt with the
internal inconsistency of the manufacturer's assertion of
common knowledge.' 27 The court observed that the in-
dustry had, at other times and in court, asserted that "the
evidence regarding the relationship between smoking and
lung cancer is deficient and unreliable and without scien-
tific and medical basis ... "128 The defendant attempted
to fault Mrs. Cipollone for her failure to accept and rely
upon the allegedly inaccurate and unsupported informa-
tion. 29 The ultimate implication of this position is that the
allegedly inaccurate, unproven, and unreliable information
was sufficient warning for the smoker, thereby foreclosing
recovery of damages by the plaintiff who believed the in-
dustry's version of the information. The inherent incon-
sistency in this position was held sufficient to permit the
jury to infer that defendant's contentions lacked good faith
and credibility. 130 Furthermore,
the irony of defendants' position is compound-
ed by defendants' further assertion that the par-
ticular cancer suffered by Mrs. Cipollone is not
the type of cancer caused by or associated with
smoking while simultaneously contending that
there is no type of cancer which has been pro-
ven to be caused by smoking.' 3 ' (Emphasis in
original.)
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B. Similarly Situated Product Cases
The Cipollone decision is a substantial break from
other tobacco injury cases as well as other cases dealing
with injuries resulting from a similarly situated product-
alcohol. In Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co.,'32
the court said that manufacturers are required to warn of
hidden and unknown (as opposed to obvious and well-
known) dangers in their products; but the manufacturer is
entitled to rely on the good judgment and common sense
of the consumer.1
33
In Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 13 4 the court held that,
in view of the dangers involved in the use of alcoholic
beverages, manufacturer has no duty to warn consumers
of the common "propensities" of alcohol. 1 35 In Morris v.
Adolph Coors Co., 136 the court said that the product in-
volved was not "unreasonably dangerous" since it was not
alleged that the product was dangerous to an extent beyond
the contemplation of the ordinary consumer possessed of
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
the characteristics of the product. 
137
C. Warnings, Generally
An otherwise perfect product may be defective because
the warning is deficient. 138 In Maize139 the plaintiff was
allowed to recover because the manufacturer failed to ade-
quately warn of the danger from the toxic fumes of the
cleaning fluid. In Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc.,1 40 action was
allowed against manufacturer of polio vaccine who failed
to provide adequate warning about risk of contracting polio
after vaccination. Plaintiff participated in a mass polio vac-
cination process, but acquired and became paralyzed with
polio shortly thereafter. It was unclear whether plaintiff
would have chosen to proceed with the inoculation had he
been adequately warned about the risk of contracting
polio;14' but information regarding the vaccine had assured
its safety. 142 It is presumed that the consumer will ordinarily
advert to product hazards that are commonly known,
whether or not such knowledge is attributable to him. A
similar presumption operates where a warning is provided
regarding the particular hazards of a product. It is incum-
bent upon the consumer to heed the warning or bear the
risk of injury. The warning must apprise the consumer of
the product hazards.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF WARNINGS IN
THE PRESENCE OF OVERPROMOTION
Extensive product advertising and promotion has been
acknowledged to carry the impact of diluting warnings
which would ordinarily be adequate to inform consumers
about the product's hazards. In Brazzell v. United States, 4
the court said that the intensive advertising approach taken
by the government negated the warnings about the risks
involved in immunization. In the satisfaction of the duty
to give adequate warnings, mariufacturers may not engage
in advertising and promotion activities the natural conse-
quence of which is to dilute the warnings.1 44 "The tobacco
industry is one of the few examples that come to mind
which give warnings of the hazards associated with its pro-
duct, and then, through advertising, seeks to induce the
consumer to ignore such warnings." 4 '
The cigarette cases are largely predicated on
allegations that tobacco manufacturers have
not adequately warned consumers of the
dangers attributed to smoking, but that to the
contrary, their advertising and promotional
practices have tended to allay the health con-
cerns of the smoking public (by, for instance,
associating smoking with images of health,
glamour, success and happiness).
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In a case involving Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Com-
pany, the F.T.C. ordered the company to stop advertising
its cigarettes as having no adverse effects. 1 47 The court
noted that even the company's witnesses did not entertain
the view that smoking was harmless. 148 Even in the
presence of preemption, the F.C.C. granted a petition re-
questing significant television time for anti-smoking effort
to combat the implications of televised commercials pro-
moting cigarettes. 4 9 In sustaining the granting of the peti-
tion, the court stated that cigarette warnings were
inadequate, and "merely flash[ed] danger signals without
either particularizing the danger or providing facts on which
it may be appraised."' 50
The television advertising by the cigarette companies
reeled in huge profits, but following the decision, and after
the anti-smoking campaign became successful through
television, the cigarette companies did not mount a strong
opposition to a ban on televised advertising of their pro-
ducts.'"' There were movements and organizations form-
ed to combat cigarette advertising, particularly where such
advertising made inaccurate claims. 5 2 These groups
employed slogans designed to counteract the effectiveness
of the cigarette advertisements and highlight the "adver-
tisers' disregard of the health consequences of smoking [as
well as] the insidious psychological appeal of the adver-
tisements."'53 One example of such slogans is 'The world
is my ashtray," found interposed with an advertisement
featuring the Marlboro Man and his wide open range.5 4
How effectively are cigarette warnings displayed?
Generally the distance and speed of view only allow the
viewer the impact of the attractive woman elegantly
displayed with a cigarette and engaged in some enjoyable
activity that appeals to the senses. In other instances, males
appearing in these ads are given the appearance of rug-
gedness and riding healthfully on the open and unpolluted
terrain looking toward the sunset-e.g., the Marlboro Man.
In other cases similar to beer ads, some of the adver-
tisements take a prurient nature.
Some cigarette advertisements have made particular
spurious health claims. "For example, young smokers were
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at one time assured that 'Chesterfield is Best For You' and
that 'Nose, throat, accessory organs [are] not adversely af-
fected by smoking Chesterfield.' "' In the 1950's cigarette
companies marketed their products claiming reduced level
and concentration of certain carcinogenic and other
deleterious substances. 15 6 The introduction of the "filter"
was hailed to reduce the tar and nicotine contents of cigaret-
tes; hence many smokers switched to reflect this assurance
of healthier cigarettes.'57 Even though the companies were
hesitant to accept the implication that their previous pro-
ducts were unhealthy, statistical research confirmed that
filters reduced the risk of illnesses induced by smoking.'
8
These claims were perceived by the target audience as mak-
ing positive health assurances; consequently, they had the
impact of overwhelming health related fears that may have
emanated from the tobacco hazards that were in the do-
main of common knowledge. The low tar wars of the period
led to deceitful competition which ended in 1960 follow-
ing voluntary agreement by the companies and after the
Federal Trade Commission prohibited the deceitful claims
about tar and nicotine contents. 5 9
In Lorillard v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 16 1 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the advertising claims
by the company were false, deceptive and misleading,
thereby warranting the cease and desist order issued by
the Federal Trade Commission. The company had claim-
ed that the advertised cigarettes contained less of certain
popular toxic ingredients, such as nicotine, tars, resins and
other irritants, than other cigarettes compared.' 6' One of






See impartial Test by Reader's Digest Ju-
ly Issue.
See How Your Brand Compares with Old
Gold.
Reader's Digest assigned a scientific testing
laboratory to find out about cigarettes. They
tested seven leading cigarettes and Reader's
Digest published the results.
The cigarette whose smoke was lowest in
nicotine was Old Gold. The cigarette with the
least throat-irritating tars and resins was Old
Gold.
162
The court noted that
[t]he fault with this advertising was not that it
did not print all that the Reader's Digest article
said, but that it printed a small part thereof in
such a way as to create an. entirely false and
misleading impression, not only as to what was
said in the article, but also as to the quality of
the company's cigarettes.
63
The injunction order of the FTC was sustained.
The injunction only serves to prevent future uses of
the advertising, but the company has already benefited from
the violation and does not incur any pecuniary loss to com-
pel it to desist from such practices. Other companies may
engage in the same practice expecting no other form of
sanction than the injunction. In this light, it is a beneficial
risk for a company to take because it makes a quick im-
pression upon health-conscious smokers and attracts them
before the advertising is stopped by the FTC. This is even
more so since the company is not forced to replace the
advertising with a statement of the court's conclusion or
a corrected version of the advertisement.
In Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds, 64 the company advertis-
ed a brand of its cigarettes claiming, "20,000 doctors say
that ... cigarettes are healthful."' 6 Obviously, these adver-
tisements are intended by the companies to overwhelm any
health related fears generated by both anti-smoking cam-
paigns and the surgeon general's warnings.
Interestingly, preemption is another arena in
which the industry proclaims itself judge and
jury. When it wishes to include more than what
the Labeling Act calls for, it does not regard
itself as preempted from doing so. Thus, pur-
suant to agreement rather than by statutory or
regulatory fiat, companies list the level of tar
and nicotine in an obvious statement regarding
the health issue. In fact, it chooses not merely
to state a level, but to do so in a manner that
appears to add governmental approval, similar
to finding'U.S. Approved' stamped on a cut of
meat.
166
Under these circumstances, it would be fair to conclude
that the warning notices and official admonitions relating




It has generally been claimed by tobacco interests that
"all those who have attempted to prove the evil effects of
tobacco have failed to establish a valid scientific case[;]"
168
and that the alleged adverse effects of smoking have not
been conclusively proven.' 69 The available information con-
cerning the hazards of smoking may not alter the pattern
of post-1966 judicial decisions, but it is essential for a plain-
tiff who denominates his claims pre- and post-1966. More
significantly, if Cipollone is sustained on appeal, this type
of information would, at least, complement it and enable
future pre-1966 claims to survive. In addition, it may ad-
vance the theory of addiction. 7 '
It must not be ignored that the health and safety of
the public, particularly those who would be deterred from
smoking if they had full, unadulterated information about
the health hazards of smoking, are the major concern of
the effort to achieve adequate warning. Whether the scien-
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tific evidence is conclusive or not, there is enough consen-
sus in the medical community to warrant inclusion of war-
nings apprising the consuming public of suspected or
disputed hazards. The public is safer when preventive and
precautionary measures are taken. Waiting for conclusive
evidence before warnings are put forward ignores the fact
that the consumers are human beings, not guinea pigs or
other laboratory animals.
Cipollone has put a remarkable burden upon the
cigarette industry with regard to their "common knowledge"
defense. This defense has been successful for the manufac-
turers of alcoholic beverages, particularly since Comment
i of Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, uses
alcohol and tobacco as examples of products which are
theoretically purged of their hazardous nature by the mere
judicial acceptance of the assertion that everyone knows,
or should know, of such hazards. Cipollone effectively
prevents the cigarette industry from claiming that it did not
know of the hazardous nature of its products while it seeks
to be purged of liability by claiming that its consumers know
and should have accepted the same hazards vehemently
disputed by the industry.
Congress may eventually take steps to rectify the
preemption problem which forms the latest defense for the
cigarette industry. This is, however, unlikely at this stage
primarily because the Supreme Court has not said a word
about the effect of the preemptive force of the Labeling Act
on state-based tort claims brought against cigarette com-
panies. At present, the circuit courts of appeal have had
the last word in tobacco products liability litigation.
If Cipollone is sustained on appeal, it will also have
the tertiary effect of raising concerns in the alcohol industry.
This is primarily because tobacco and alcohol have tradi-
tionally been considered to have the same status. The
failure of the alcohol industry to provide warnings is
minimized by the fact that the industry, in contrast to the
-cigarette industry, desisted from categorical challenges and
denials of commonly known and accepted hazards inherent
in the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
In anticipation of successful products liability suits
against the industry, and in the face of successful anti-
smoking efforts, cigarette companies have intensified their
efforts to acquire new product lines and diversify their stock
portfolio in the junk food market. This will, in the end, help
cushion the blow of successful litigation against the in-
dustry; but one recurring problem is the economics of the
situation: the courts and Congress will have to make their
decision(s) weighing the burden of lost taxes and jobs as
well as the health hazards and injuries encountered by
smokers.
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